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Who is really paying for Nigeria’s bloodbath?
We talk endlessly about “terrorists”, “Fulani herdsmen”, “bandits”, “unknown gunmen” – as if they are ghosts who appear from thin air, armed to the teeth, fuelled, fed and endlessly resupplied by magic.
They are not ghosts.
They are funded.
And the sponsors are not barefoot militants in the bush – they are people in suits, kaftans and uniforms; sitting in air-conditioned offices in Abuja, Lagos, Kaduna, Dubai and beyond.
This is an attempt to pull back the veil.
1. The Myth of “Faceless Sponsors”
In 2022, the Nigerian government quietly admitted that 96 terrorism financiers had been identified by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) as backing Boko Haram and ISWAP.
These were not rumours. They were based on financial intelligence – bank records, transfers, suspicious transaction reports – shared with law-enforcement agencies for prosecution.
Yet till today, Nigerians do not have a public, detailed list of:
Who these 96 people and entities are
What political or business networks they belong to
What has become of the cases
So when government officials and foreign partners repeat the cliché, “We will go after the sponsors,” understand this: they already know many of them. The problem is not lack of intelligence. The problem is lack of political will.
2. Boko Haram, ISWAP and the Business of Holy War
Religious fundamentalism is the branding; money is the engine.
Serious studies of terrorist financing in West Africa show that groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP rely on a cocktail of funding sources:
Kidnapping for ransom (locally and across borders)
“Taxes” and extortion on traders, farmers, transporters and local businesses
Protection rackets in areas they control
Cattle rustling and smuggling
Cross-border cash couriers and informal transfer systems
Occasional donations from sympathisers and extremist networks in the wider Sahel and beyond
A 2025 political-economy study on terrorism financing in Nigeria makes it clear: terror has become a profitable shadow industry, feeding off state weakness, corruption, and collusion between armed actors and elements in business and politics.
So when you hear “Boko Haram sponsors”, don’t picture only bearded ideologues. Picture:
Contractors inflating security and reconstruction contracts in the Northeast
Corrupt officers who divert military funds, sell fuel, food, or even ammunition into black markets
Local powerbrokers who pay terrorists not to attack “their” communities or interests
The line between terror financier, corrupt official and business middleman is often paper-thin.
3. Bandits, Gold and the New War Economy in the North-West
Now to the so-called “bandits” and those securing mineral sites.
Multiple investigations and policy briefs have shown a direct link between illegal gold mining in Zamfara and neighbouring states and the rise of heavily armed bandit groups.
Key facts:
Nigeria loses billions of dollars annually to illegal mining, a significant share coming from gold extracted in the North-West.
Armed groups tax miners, control pits, and exchange raw gold directly for weapons and ammunition through cross-border smuggling networks.
Foreign criminal networks – including buyers linked to gold markets in the UAE and elsewhere – are key players in laundering this blood gold through international supply chains.
In other words, many of the “bandits” terrorising villagers are not just random criminals; they are armed gatekeepers of an illegal resource economy. They secure sites, control routes, and enforce “order” for those making real money behind the scenes.
Who sits behind these networks?
Local political godfathers who benefit from informal mining
Security and regulatory insiders who “look away” for a fee
Foreign buyers and brokers who move the gold out and move the weapons in
If you follow the gold, you begin to see that the AK-47 in the bush is just the last link in a chain that starts in plush offices and foreign trading hubs.
4. Fulani Militias, Farmer–Herder Violence and the Sahel Pipeline
The phrase “Fulani expansionism” is now thrown around freely, often in ways that unfairly demonise an entire ethnic group. We must be careful: most Fulani are not militants, and most are not involved in organised violence.
But there are armed Fulani-identified militias and criminal gangs who have:
Exploited herder–farmer tensions
Used the chaos of the Sahel jihadist wars
Tapped into the same arms-trafficking and smuggling pipelines feeding Boko Haram, ISWAP and other extremist groups.
International and regional reports show:
Rising communal militias made up of both herders and farmers, often mobilised along ethnic and religious lines.
A massive proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) across Nigeria and the Sahel – through porous borders, local gunsmiths, and diversion of state stockpiles.
Who sponsors these armed herder and community militias?
Local elites who arm “their boys” as private security or political thugs
Smugglers and rustling syndicates who use ethnic cover for pure business
Jihadist groups that sometimes piggyback on Fulani–farmer tensions to recruit, train and arm fighters
Here again, the money and weapons often come from far beyond the village – from regional criminal networks, arms traffickers, and corrupt officials.
5. The Real Beneficiaries: A Criminal–Political Cartel
Step back and a clear pattern emerges:
1. Terrorist groups and bandits control territory, intimidate populations, collect “taxes” and guard illegal economies (gold, cattle, levies, smuggling).
2. Local and national elites tap into these arrangements – paying for protection, buying stolen resources, or using violence as a political instrument.
3. Foreign actors – arms dealers, gold traders, shadowy businesses – provide the cross-border infrastructure that turns local blood into global profit.
This is why unmasking sponsors is so difficult:
Do it honestly, and you will not stop at a few bearded preachers in the bush.
You will end up in the homes of politicians, security chiefs, royal palaces, business moguls, bureaux-de-change operators, foreign brokers and even “development partners.”
That is the red line no government has yet had the courage to cross fully.
6. Why the List Stays Hidden
Nigeria has:
An intelligence unit (NFIU) tracking suspicious financial flows
Regional and international support from GIABA, FATF and others on terrorist financing and money laundering
Public admissions that terrorism financiers exist – and have been identified
Yet prosecutions are rare, convictions are fewer, and names almost never see daylight.
Why?
Because a full, honest exposure of sponsors would shake the political and economic establishment to its core.
You cannot wage a real war on terror financiers without:
Exposing people in ruling parties and opposition alike
Indicting some security insiders
Disrupting powerful business interests – from illegal mining to opaque security contracts
Embarrassing foreign “allies” whose markets and lax regulations enable gold-for-arms, cash smuggling and trade-based money laundering
So instead, we get:
Dramatic speeches
Secret “lists”
Occasional token arrests
And a permanent, profitable war that never really ends.
7. What “Unmasking Them” Would Actually Look Like
If we are serious about unmasking the sponsors of terrorism, religious fundamentalism, Fulani militias and mineral bandits, it cannot just be social-media rage.
It would require:
Publishing a verified list of investigated terrorism financiers, with evidence summarised
Sanctioning and freezing assets of individuals and companies – locally and in foreign financial centres
Breaking the gold-for-arms circuit by targeting foreign buyers and hubs that knowingly launder conflict minerals
Independent forensic audits of security and humanitarian spending in conflict zones, as billions of dollars have flowed through the Northeast and North-West with very little transparency
Disarming communal militias on all sides, not selectively, while tracking the origin of their weapons
Until then, “sponsors of terror” will remain a convenient slogan – weaponised when needed, buried when it gets too close to the powerful.
Final Word
Terrorism, religious extremism, Fulani militias and mineral banditry in Nigeria are not random storms. They are systems, built on money, weapons and protection at the highest levels.
The ordinary Fulani herder, the ordinary farmer, the Christian in the village, the Muslim in the market – they are all victims in a bigger game.
If we truly want to end this nightmare, we must stop chasing shadows in the bush and start following the money – ruthlessly, regardless of whose name is on the account.
That is where the real sponsors live.
By Hon Chima Nnadi-Oforgu
Duruebube Uzii na Abosi
